The Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard can be effective in resisting frivolous claims by plaintiffs. This pleading standard demands “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
In applying these standards, a court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss need not accept the truth of legal conclusions–only well-pleaded, nonclusory facts. Id., at 1949-50. Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint set forth the grounds of the pleader’s entitlement to relief through more than labels, conclusions and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Id., at 1949 (citing Twombly, at 555). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, at 1949 (quoting Twombly, at 555).
Furthermore, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 1950. If the “well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Recently, we convinced a federal court to dismiss a shareholder suit because the complaint did not meet the pleading standards of Twombly/Iqbal.